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DISCUSSION AFTER THE SPEECH OF JOHN S. MCKENNIREY
QUESTION, Professor King: In connection with the Agreement,
as I gathered, if Mexico wanted to reduce its labor laws in terms of
standards, it is perfectly privileged to do so, but it is the question of
enforcing the standards; is that it?
ANSWER, Mr. McKennirey: This is the question which was an
essential question during the negotiations. Mexico is committed, just as
is Canada and the United States, to promoting the language and labor
principles of the Agreement to the maximum extent possible. But how
that is expressed within a country's legislative framework is that coun-
try's business. I think it is fair to say that if a country was about to do
something that was totally contrary on the face of it, like eliminate all
child labor protection or something like that, the other parties would
have the right under the Agreement to take issue with you, to have
consultations with you, and to question whether this is consistent with
the overall objective of the Agreement. So it is a political reality but
not, as you say, a technical or legal reality under the disciplines of the
Agreement.
QUESTION, Professor King: Regarding the administration, it
says in the Agreement that you have fifteen people to administer it,
which is not very many. I am concerned that is not an adequate staff to
do the job.
ANSWER, Mr. McKennirey: An important aspect of the Agree-
ment is the staff in each country's national administrative office. The
labor agreement is unlike the environmental agreement, which did not
create these national administrative offices to respond to the public.
This is, in fact, the job of the secretariat in Montreal. However, that
same work is delegated to the national level in our Agreement. So there
is a need for a significantly large work force.
Second, those offices also run a very important cooperative pro-
gram between the two governments. Moreover, each of these offices has
five or ten people. We will just have to wait and see whether our office
is the right size.
QUESTION, Professor King: Let me ask you about a typical
case. One case that drew some attentiofi{in the United States was the
Sony case. Do you want to describe how that operated, and what ex-
actly happened in that case?
ANSWER, Mr. McKennirey: What we are seeing is cross-border
communication and cooperation among workers and unions in order to
make the Agreement work. Here the problem arose within Mexico. A
group of workers was attempting to organize an up-start union within a
company, which was already unionized. The workers were very frus-
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trated in their efforts in getting their new union registered under the
Mexican registration system. They contacted fellow union members in
the United States and informed them that they were unable to form a
free union in Mexico and that it could have implications for industrial
relations in North America.
The American unions brought the case to their government, public
interest groups, and their national administrative office in Washington.
The American union informed these bodies that the labor law in Mex-
ico was not being applied as it should be in this particular case and
that this was part of a general problem.
The U.S. National Administrative Office held hearings and re-
ceived briefs on the issue and recommended to the U.S. Secretary of
Labor that he request consultations on this matter with the Mexican
Secretary of Labor.
That is as far as you could take this particular issue under the
Agreement. This issue has to do with union formation and freedom of
association. Matters relating to freedom of association, the right to bar-
gain, and the right to strike can only go to the level of ministerial con-
sultations in that Agreement.
The next level that you could go to in a different area of labor law
would be to call for an independent evaluation committee, which would
conduct a tri-national study on the particular matter. And in areas re-
lated to safety and health and child labor and minimum wage, you
could go further to international dispute resolution and international
arbitration.
Backing up, in this case you could only go to ministerial consulta-
tions. So the Secretary of Labor of the United States and the Secretary
of Labor of Mexico held consultations on the question. And those con-
sultations took about three, four, or five months.
Out of that process came the public action plan, which included:
first, sending a team from the Mexican headquarters of the Mexican
Labor Department out to the local area to explain to the workers their
rights and the proper procedures to apply for union registration; sec-
ond, holding three public forums, one in each country. As it ultimately
evolved, two were held in Mexico and one was held in the United
States on the question of union formation and union registration in
Mexico, Canada, and the United States. The first forum in Mexico
City was very highly publicized and had a great deal of media
attention.
In addition to that, a special study was commissioned by the Mexi-
can government of independent academics to report back to them on
this problem. That public report has not been published, but should be
published shortly. That was the outcome.
QUESTION, Professor King- Let me ask you another question on
the dispute resolution provisions. Suppose you get a real issue. Mexico
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is not enforcing its labor laws. Do you want to take us through in
rather brief fashion how that dispute will be resolved and what the
eventual teeth in the Agreement are?
ANSWER, Mr. McKennirey: If we are going to use the dental
analogy, the best way to begin is to suggest a dispute related to occupa-
tional safety, which is a matter that can go all the way. This argument
suggests that one country was not enforcing occupational safety and
health standards.
The first stage would be ministerial consultations. It would origi-
nate as a complaint within one country regarding the conditions in an-
other country. That would go to the desk of the Secretary of Labor and
the Minister of Labor in the country where the complainants were re-
siding. For example, the Canadian complaint would state that the
Americans were not enforcing their safety and health standards and
that this is a big advantage. The Canadian Minister may decide right
away to ask for consultations with the Secretary of Labor. If the con-
sultations are unsatisfactory and the U.S. Secretary of Labor finds that
there is no problem, then the Canadian government could ask for an
evaluation committee of experts. That decision can be made by one
government. It is not required that you have two agree, which is an
interesting feature of the labor Agreement. Any one country can act
unilaterally on this matter.
It will then land on my desk at that point in time, and I have to
organize this evaluation committee of experts. They have a very short
time frame in which to produce a report - when I say short, I mean
about six months, so they have about six months to produce a tri-na-
tional report on the administration of labor law in that particular area
of concern in the three countries.
Part of the reason for this is that you need to establish a base line
for what is meant by "administration." No law is perfectly enforced,
whether it is a traffic law or anything else. So you need some kind of
base-line study in order to evaluate whether or not a country is really
out of line or not. So this evaluation committee reviews what is being
done in all three countries and examines the particular process of the
health and safety standard and whether one country is seriously defi-
cient. In the end, the committee reports back to the ministers, and the
problem may be solved there.
If on the basis of this report two countries are now convinced that
the third country really is remiss, they may want to initiate dispute
resolution. Again, dispute resolution begins with consultations in an ef-
fort to resolve this dispute. What you are asking the third country to do
is to recognize the problem and to do something about it. This could
mean using more inspectors or whatever administrative procedure you
want to use to rectify the situation. If, however, the country is unwill-
ing to recognize the problem or is unwilling to fix the problem, then an
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arbitral panel could be created at the request of the parties. They
would review the situation again based on the evaluation committee's
report and additional information and would come up with a prescribed
plan of action for the offending country to fix the problem.
There would be further consultations on the prescribed plan of ac-
tion. Then if a party refused to accept the decision of the arbitral panel
and refused to accept the prescribed plan of action, the arbitral panel
could impose a fine of up to twenty million dollars.
What if the country refuses to pay the fine? If the country refuses
to pay the fine, then the lawyers take over at this point. If the country
refuses to pay the fine, Mexico and the United States can collect the
fine at the border. In Canada, they cannot collect the fine at the bor-
der, but the Canadian government can collect it through the Canadian
court system.
QUESTION, Professor King: Why is it different in Canada?
ANSWER, Mr. McKennirey: Politics, pure politics. And then
once we get the money in our hands, we give it back to the offending
nation and we say you must use this money for the administration of
your labor laws.
COMMENT, Professor King: I think it is a fascinating story.
QUESTION, Mr. Kasoff: Given this very simple process that you
have just outlined, and there is a similar process for the environmental
secretary as well, it is no surprise that there has not been a ground
swell of complaints under these procedures. I think the total number of
environmental complaints is five and perhaps you said two that only
were being actually looked at.
Now, the first question is do you get a lot more types of inquiries
that never end up in formal complaints that you can get them to re-
dress at a much lower level and, if not, how do you answer the cynics
who say, this is really just camouflage; these side agreements were just
done for domestic politics. The bureaucratic procedure is so monumen-
tal that it will never amount to anything.
ANSWER, Mr. McKennirey: The government-to-government pro-
cedures are complex. They are no more complex than Chapter 20 of
the NAFTA. And if you look at the NAFTA, there have been very few
complaints under Chapter 20. I think there was only one. Government-
to-government disputes are a lot more rare than private party disputes,
and that is what you would expect.
The procedures are there because the objective is to avoid rushing
to a judgment. These problems are extremely difficult matters to fix.
They are not even easy to define. When you get into the way in which a
union gets registered in Mexico, it is a very subtle, complex, politically
motivated issue. It is a question of expanding the transparency of that
process, developing a broader consensus, and understanding where the
problem areas are, with the government beginning to develop a public
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position on some of these issues. This is the nature of the issues with
which you are dealing. They are not simply private disputes or the fix-
ing of a particular situation where a particular person feels the labor
law does not apply to him. I think that is part of the reason that there
is so much process, and part of the reason that you would not expect
hundreds of cases a year. Just like Chapter 20 of the NAFTA, coun-
tries do not take dispute with each other or dispute resolutions between
nations unless they really have to, and unless they have worked through
the issues very carefully first.
In terms of whether it is weak or strong, my own view is that it is
very strong. When you have a situation, for instance, which we had,
where the Secretary of Labor of the United States can contact the Sec-
retary of Labor in Mexico and say, "I do not think your labor laws are
being enforced, I have had a public process and a public hearing on
this." I think that is very strong. It is completely unprecedented, and
there is an extraordinary degree of openness between countries to en-
gage in such a dialogue like this, and to actually have obligations be-
tween each other to deal with these matters, which are matters that
have been part of the private domain of domestic policy and domestic
law for all these years. To say, or at least enable each country to raise
issue regarding these matters in a public way is very strong and very
substantial. Furthermore, when you look at those who say that the
Agreement is weak because it does not contain enforceable interna-
tional standards, my answer to that usually is, take a look at what en-
forcement of international standards would involve. First of all, you
have to legislate those international standards. Second of all, you have
to have an enforcement capacity, an enforcement agency. Finally, you
have to have courts to interpret them and to enforce them. The impli-
cations of enforcing international standards leads you down the road
towards the European model with all the structures that go with it. The
ILO has international standards, but they are voluntary. There is a
very major difference there. I think some of the feeling that this Agree-
ment is weak comes from an antiquated view of what internationaliza-
tion of labor standards entails. When I see the kind of thinking that is
going on in the ILO now about the connection between labor standards
and trade, people are beginning to come to grips with the problematical
aspects of this thing, which are very difficult to resolve. I also think the
labor agreement has actually gotten very serious regarding substantial
obligations between Parties, even though they are based on domestic
law.
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